Towards Practical Differential Privacy for SQL Queries by Johnson, Noah et al.
Towards Practical Differential Privacy for SQL Queries
Noah Johnson
University of California,
Berkeley
noahj@berkeley.edu
Joseph P. Near
University of California,
Berkeley
jnear@berkeley.edu
Dawn Song
University of California,
Berkeley
dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu
ABSTRACT
Differential privacy promises to enable general data analytics while
protecting individual privacy, but existing differential privacy mech-
anisms do not support the wide variety of features and databases
used in real-world SQL-based analytics systems.
This paper presents the first practical approach for differential
privacy of SQL queries. Using 8.1 million real-world queries, we
conduct an empirical study to determine the requirements for prac-
tical differential privacy, and discuss limitations of previous ap-
proaches in light of these requirements. To meet these requirements
we propose elastic sensitivity, a novel method for approximating
the local sensitivity of queries with general equijoins. We prove
that elastic sensitivity is an upper bound on local sensitivity and
can therefore be used to enforce differential privacy using any local
sensitivity-based mechanism.
We build FLEX, a practical end-to-end system to enforce differ-
ential privacy for SQL queries using elastic sensitivity. We demon-
strate that FLEX is compatible with any existing database, can en-
force differential privacy for real-world SQL queries, and incurs
negligible (0.03%) performance overhead.
1. INTRODUCTION
As organizations increasingly collect sensitive information about
individuals, these organizations are ethically and legally obligated
to safeguard against privacy leaks. Data analysts within these orga-
nizations, however, have come to depend on unrestricted access to
data for maximum productivity. This access is frequently provided
in the form of a relational database that supports SQL queries. Cur-
rent approaches for data security and privacy cannot guarantee pri-
vacy for individuals while providing general-purpose access for the
analyst.
As demonstrated by recent insider attacks [7,8,10,11], allowing
members of an organization unrestricted access to data is a major
cause of privacy breaches. Access control policies can limit ac-
cess to a particular database, but once an analyst has access, these
policies cannot control how the data is used. Data anonymization
attempts to provide privacy while allowing general-purpose anal-
ysis, but cannot be relied upon, as demonstrated by a number of
re-identification attacks [18, 43, 46, 51].
Differential privacy [20, 23, 25] is a promising technique for ad-
dressing these issues. Differential privacy allows general statisti-
cal analysis of data while protecting data about individuals with a
strong formal guarantee of privacy.
Because of its desirable formal guarantees, differential privacy
has received growing attention from organizations including Google
and Apple. However, research on practical techniques for differen-
tial privacy has focused on special-purpose use cases, such as col-
lecting statistics about web browsing behaviors [27] and keyboard
and emoji use [1], while differential privacy for general-purpose
data analytics remains an open challenge.
Various mechanisms [14, 40–42, 44, 47] provide differential pri-
vacy for some subsets of SQL-like queries but none support the ma-
jority of queries in practice. These mechanisms also require modi-
fications to the database engine, complicating adoption in practice.
Furthermore, although the theoretical aspects of differential pri-
vacy have been studied extensively, little is known about the quan-
titative impact of differential privacy on real-world queries. Recent
work has evaluated differential privacy mechanisms on real-world
data [15,32,33], however this work uses a limited set of queries rep-
resenting a single, special-purpose analytics task such as histogram
analysis [15] or range queries [32]. To the best of our knowledge,
no existing work has explored the design and evaluation of differ-
ential privacy techniques for general, real-world queries.
This paper proposes elastic sensitivity, a novel approach for dif-
ferential privacy of SQL queries. In contrast to existing work,
our approach is compatible with real database systems, supports
queries expressed in standard SQL, and integrates easily into exist-
ing data environments. The work therefore represents a first step
towards practical differential privacy. The approach has recently
been adopted by Uber to enforce differential privacy for internal
data analytics [12].
We developed elastic sensitivity using requirements derived from
a dataset of 8.1 million real-world queries. This paper focuses on
counting queries, which constitute the majority of statistical queries
in this dataset, and discusses extensions to the approach for other
aggregation functions. We have released an open-source tool for
computing elastic sensitivity of SQL queries [4].
Contributions. We make four primary contributions toward prac-
tical differential privacy:
1. We conduct the largest known empirical study of real-world
SQL queries—8.1 million queries in total. From these results
we show that the queries used in prior work to evaluate differ-
ential privacy mechanisms are not representative of real-world
queries. We propose a new set of requirements for practical dif-
ferential privacy on SQL queries based on these results.
2. To meet these requirements, we propose elastic sensitivity, a
sound approximation of local sensitivity [22, 44] that supports
general equijoins and can be calculated efficiently using only
the query itself and a set of precomputed database metrics. We
prove that elastic sensitivity is an upper bound on local sensi-
tivity and can therefore be used to enforce differential privacy
using any local sensitivity-based mechanism.
3. We design and implement FLEX, an end-to-end differential pri-
vacy system for SQL queries based on elastic sensitivity. We
demonstrate that FLEX is compatible with any existing data-
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base, can enforce differential privacy for the majority of real-
world SQL queries, and incurs negligible (0.03%) performance
overhead.
4. In the first experimental evaluation of its kind, we use FLEX to
evaluate the impact of differential privacy on 9862 real-world
statistical queries in our dataset. In contrast to previous em-
pirical evaluations of differential privacy, our experimental set
contains a diverse variety of real-world queries executed on real
data. We show that FLEX introduces low error for a majority of
these queries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
our empirical study and defines the requirements for a practical dif-
ferential privacy mechanism. In Section 3, we define elastic sensi-
tivity and prove that elastic sensitivity is an upper bound on local
sensitivity. In Section 4 we describe FLEX, our system for enforc-
ing differential privacy using elastic sensitivity. Section 5 contains
our experimental evaluation of FLEX and Section 6 surveys related
work.
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR PRACTICAL
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We use a dataset consisting of millions of SQL queries to es-
tablish requirements for a practical differential privacy system that
supports the majority of real-world queries. We investigate the
limitations of existing general-purpose differential mechanisms in
light of these requirements, and introduce elastic sensitivity, our
new approach that meets these requirements.
We investigate the following properties of queries in our dataset:
• How many different database backends are used? A practi-
cal differential privacy system must integrate with existing da-
tabase infrastructure.
• Which relational operators are used most frequently? A
practical differential privacy system must at a minimum support
the most common relational operators.
• What types of joins are used most frequently and many are
used by a typical query? Making joins differentially private is
challenging because the output of a join may contain duplicates
of sensitive rows. This duplication is difficult to bound as it de-
pends on the join type, join condition, and the underlying data.
Understanding the different types of joins and their relative fre-
quencies is therefore critical for supporting differential privacy
on these queries.
• What fraction of queries use aggregations and which ag-
gregation functions are used most frequently? Aggregation
functions in SQL return statistics about populations in the data.
Aggregation and non-aggregation queries represent fundamen-
tally different privacy problems, as will be shown. A practical
system must at minimum support the most common aggrega-
tions.
• How complex are typical queries and how large are typical
query results? To be practical, a differential privacy mecha-
nism must support real-world queries without imposing restric-
tions on query syntax, and it must scale to typical result sizes.
Dataset. We use a dataset of SQL queries written by employees at
Uber. The dataset contains 8.1 million queries executed between
March 2013 and August 2016 on a broad range of sensitive data
including rider and driver information, trip logs, and customer sup-
port data.
Data analysts at Uber query this information in support of many
business interests such as improving service, detecting fraud, and
understanding trends in the business. The majority of these use-
cases require flexible, general-purpose analytics.
Given the size and diversity of our dataset, we believe it is rep-
resentative of SQL queries in other real-world situations.
2.1 Study Results
We first summarize the study results, then define requirements
of a practical differential privacy technique for real-world queries
based on these results.
Question 1: How many different database backends are used?
# 
qu
er
ie
s
1
1000
1000000
Vertica Postgres MySQL Hive Presto Other
29,38739,52181,66094,206
1,494,680
6,362,631
Results. The queries in our dataset use more than 6 database back-
ends, including Vertica, Postgres, MySQL, Hive, and Presto.
Question 2: Which relational operators are used most frequently?
Operator Frequency
Select 100%
Join 62.1%
Union 0.57%
Minus/Except 0.06%
Intersect 0.03%
Results. All queries in our dataset
use the Select operator, more than
half of the queries use the Join
operator, and fewer than 1 percent
use other operators such as Union,
Minus, and Intersect.
Question 3: How many joins are used by a typical query?
Jo
in
s 
in
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16
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# queries
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25
Results. A significant number of queries use multiple joins, with
queries using as many as 95 joins.
Question 4: What types of joins are used most frequently?
Left join 
29%
Cross join 
1% Inner join 69%
Other 
1%
Equijoin 
76%
Literal Comparison 
2%
Compound Expr. 
19%
Col. Comparison 
3%
Non self-join 
72%
Self-join 
28%
Many-to-many 
10%
One-to-one 
26% One-to-many 
64%
Join condition Join relationship Self join Join type
 1
Join condition. The vast majority (76%) of joins are equijoins:
joins that are conditioned on value equality of one column from
both relations. A separate experiment (not shown) reveals that
65.9% of all join queries use exclusively equijoins.
Compound expressions, defined as join conditions using func-
tion applications and conjunctions and disjunctions of primitive op-
erators, account for 19% of join conditions. Column comparisons,
defined as conditions that compare two columns using non-equality
operators such as greater than, comprise 3% of join conditions.
Literal comparisons, defined as join conditions comparing a single
column to a string or integer literal, comprise 2% of join conditions.
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Join relationship. A majority of joins (64%) are conditioned on
one-to-many relationships, over one-quarter of joins (26%) are con-
ditioned on one-to-one relationships, and 10% of joins are condi-
tioned on many-to-many relationships.
Self join. 28% of queries include at least one self join, defined
as a join in which the same database table appears in both joined
relations. The remaining queries (72%) contain no self joins.
Join type. Inner join is the most common join type (69%), followed
by left join (29%) and cross join (1%). The remaining types (right
join and full join) together account for less than 1%.
Question 5: What fraction of queries use aggregations?
Statistical 34%
Raw data 66%
Raw data 
66%
Statistical 
34%
Statistical Raw data
 1
Results. Approximately one-third of
queries are statistical, meaning they re-
turn only aggregations (count, average,
etc.). The remaining queries return non-
aggregated results (i.e., raw data) in at
least one output column.
Question 6: Which aggregation functions are used most fre-
quently?
Sum 29
Avg 8.4
Max 5.9
Min 4.9
Median 0.3
Stddev 0.1
Count 51
0
15
30
45
60
Sum Avg Max Min Median Stddev Count
Count 
51%
Min 
5%
Max 
6%
Avg 
8%
Sum 
29%
Sum Avg Max Min Median Stddev Count
Median 0.3%Stddev. 0.1%
 1
Results. Count is the most common ag-
gregation function (51%), followed by
Sum (29%), Avg (8%), Max (6%) and
Min (5%). The remaining functions ac-
count for fewer than 1% of all aggrega-
tion functions.
Question 7: How complex are typical queries?
Qu
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Results. The majority of queries are fewer than 100 clauses but a
significant number of queries are much larger, with some queries
containing as many as thousands of clauses.
Question 8: How large are typical query results?
Result size (rows)
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Result size (columns)
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Results. The output sizes of queries varies dramatically with re-
spect to both rows and columns, and queries commonly return hun-
dreds of columns and hundreds of thousands of rows.
2.2 Summary of Results
Our study reveals that real-world queries are executed on many
different database engines—in our dataset there are over 6. We
believe this is typical; a variety of databases are commonly used
within a company to match specific performance and scalability
requirements. A practical mechanism for differential privacy will
therefore allow the use of any of these existing databases, requir-
ing neither a specific database distribution nor a custom execution
engine in lieu of a standard database.
The study shows that 62.1% of all queries use SQL Join, and
specifically equijoins which are by far the most common. Addi-
tionally, a majority of queries use multiple joins, more than one-
quarter use self joins, and joins are conditioned on one-to-one, one-
to-many, and many-to-many relationships. These results suggest
that a practical differential privacy approach must at a minimum
provide robust support for equijoins, including the full spectrum of
join relationships and an arbitrary number of nested joins.
One-third (34%) of all queries return aggregate statistics. Differ-
ential privacy is principally designed for such queries, and in the
remainder of this paper we focus on these queries. Enforcing dif-
ferential privacy for raw data queries is beyond the scope of this
work, as differential privacy is generally not intended to address
this problem.
For statistical queries, Count is by far the most common aggre-
gation. This validates the focus on counting and histogram queries
by the majority of previous general-purpose differential privacy
mechanisms [14, 40, 42, 47]. Our work similarly focuses on this
class of queries. In Section 3.7.2 we discuss possible extensions to
support other aggregation functions.
Requirements. We summarize our requirements for practical dif-
ferential privacy of real-world SQL queries:
• Requirement 1: Compatibility with existing databases. A
practical differential privacy approach must support heteroge-
neous database environments by not requiring a specific data-
base distribution or replacement of the database with a custom
runtime.
• Requirement 2: Robust support for equijoin. A practical dif-
ferential privacy approach must provide robust support for equi-
join, including both self joins and non-self joins, all join rela-
tionship types, and queries with an arbitrary number of nested
joins.
Our study shows that a differential privacy system satisfying
these requirements is likely to have broad impact, supporting a ma-
jority of real-world statistical queries.
2.3 Existing Differential Privacy Mechanisms
Several existing general-purpose differential privacy mechanisms
support queries with join. Table 1 summarizes these mechanisms
and their supported features in comparison to our proposed mech-
anism (last row). In Section 6 we discuss additional mechanisms
which are not considered here either because they are not general-
purpose or they cannot support joins.
PINQ. Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ) [40] is a mechanism that
provides differential privacy for counting queries written in an aug-
mented SQL dialect. PINQ supports a restricted join operator that
groups together results with the same key. For one-to-one joins,
this operator is equivalent to the standard semantics. For one-to-
many and many-to-many joins, on the other hand, a PINQ query
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Table 1: Comparison of general-purpose differential privacy mechanisms with support for join.
Requirement 1︷︸︸︷ Requirement 2︷ ︸︸ ︷Database One-to-one One-to-many Many-to-many
compatibility equijoin equijoin equijoin
PINQ [40] X
wPINQ [47] X X X
Restricted sensitivity [14] X X
DJoin [42] X
Elastic sensitivity (this work) X X X X
can count the number of unique join keys but not the number of
joined results. Additionally, PINQ introduces new operators that
do not exist in standard SQL, so the approach is not compatible
with standard databases.
wPINQ. Weighted PINQ (wPINQ) [47] extends PINQ with sup-
port for general equijoins and works by assigning a weight to each
row in the database, then scaling down the weights of rows in a
join to ensure an overall sensitivity of 1. In wPINQ, the result of
a counting query is the sum of weights for records being counted
plus noise drawn from the Laplace distribution. This approach al-
lows wPINQ to support all three types of joins. However, wPINQ
does not satisfy our database compatibility requirement. The sys-
tem described by Proserpio et al. [47] uses a custom runtime; ap-
plying wPINQ in an existing database would require modifying the
database to propagate weights during execution.
Restricted sensitivity. Restricted sensitivity [14] is designed to
bound the global sensitivity of counting queries with joins, by us-
ing properties of an auxiliary data model. The approach requires
bounding the frequency of each join key globally (i.e. for all pos-
sible future databases). This works well for one-to-one and one-
to-many joins, because the unique key on the “one” side of the
join has a global bound. However, it cannot handle many-to-many
joins, because the frequency of keys on both sides of the join may
be unbounded. Blocki et al. [14] formalize the restricted sensitivity
approach but do not describe how it could be used in a system com-
patible with existing databases, and no implementation is available.
DJoin. DJoin [42] is a mechanism designed for differentially pri-
vate queries over datasets distributed over multiple parties. Due to
the additional restrictions associated with this setting, DJoin sup-
ports only one-to-one joins, because it rewrites join queries as rela-
tional intersections. For example, consider the following query:
SELECT COUNT (∗) FROM X JOIN Y ON X.A = Y.B
DJoin rewrites this query to the following (in relational algebra),
which is semantically equivalent to the original query only if the
join is one-to-one: |piA(X) ∩ piB(Y )|.
Additionally, the approach requires the use of special crypto-
graphic functions during query execution, so it is not compatible
with existing databases.
To address the limitations of existing mechanisms we propose
elastic sensitivity, discussed next. Elastic sensitivity is compatible
with any existing database and supports general equijoins with the
full spectrum of join relationships. This combination allows use of
elastic sensitivity in real-world settings.
3. Elastic Sensitivity
Elastic sensitivity is a novel approach for calculating an upper
bound on a query’s local sensitivity. After motivating the approach,
we provide background on necessary concepts in Section 3.2, for-
mally define elastic sensitivity in Section 3.3, give an example in
Section 3.4, prove its correctness in Section 3.5, and discuss an
optimization in Section 3.6.
3.1 Motivation
Many previous differential privacy mechanisms [14,40] are based
on global sensitivity. These approaches do not generalize to queries
with joins; the global sensitivity of queries with general joins may
be unbounded because “a join has the ability to multiply input
records, so that a single input record can influence an arbitrarily
large number of output records.” [40]
Techniques based on local sensitivity [22, 44] generally provide
greater utility than global sensitivity-based approaches because they
consider the actual database. Indeed, local sensitivity is finite for
general queries with joins. However, directly computing local sen-
sitivity is computationally infeasible, as it requires running the query
on every possible neighbor of the true database—in our environ-
ment this would require running more than 1 billion queries for
each original query. Previous work [44] describes efficient meth-
ods to calculate local sensitivity for a limited set of fixed queries
(e.g., the median of all values in the database) but these techniques
do not apply to general-purpose queries or queries with join.
These challenges are reflected in the design of previous mech-
anisms listed in Table 1. PINQ and restricted sensitivity support
only joins for which global sensitivity can be bounded, and wPINQ
scales weights attached to the data during joins to ensure a global
sensitivity of 1. DJoin uses a measure of sensitivity unique to its
distributed setting. None of these techniques are based on local
sensitivity.
Elastic sensitivity is the first tractable approach to leverage local
sensitivity for queries with general equijoins. The key insight of
our approach is to model the impact of each join in the query using
precomputed metrics about the frequency of join keys in the true
database. This novel approach allows elastic sensitivity to compute
a conservative approximation of local sensitivity without requiring
any additional interactions with the database. In Section 3.5, we
prove elastic sensitivity is an upper bound on local sensitivity and
can therefore be used with any local sensitivity-based differential
privacy mechanism. In Section 4, we describe how to use elastic
sensitivity to enforce differential privacy.
3.2 Background
We briefly summarize existing differential privacy concepts nec-
essary for describing our approach. For a more thorough overview
of differential privacy, we refer the reader to Dwork and Roth’s ex-
cellent reference [25].
Differential privacy provides a formal guarantee of indistinguisha-
bility: a differentially private result does not yield very much in-
formation about which of two neighboring databases was used in
calculating the result.
Formally, differential privacy considers a database modeled as a
vector x ∈ Dn, in which xi represents the data contributed by user
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i. The distance between two databases x, y ∈ Dn is d(x, y) =
|{i|xi 6= yi}|. Two databases x, y are neighbors if d(x, y) = 1.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A randomized mechanism K :
Dn → Rd preserves (, δ)-differential privacy if for any pair of
databases x, y ∈ Dn such that d(x, y) = 1, and for all sets S of
possible outputs:
Pr[K(x) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[K(y) ∈ S] + δ
Intuitively, the sensitivity of a query corresponds to the amount
its results can change when the database changes. One measure of
sensitivity is global sensitivity, which is the maximum difference
in the query’s result on any two neighboring databases.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity). For f : Dn → Rd and all x, y ∈
Dn, the global sensitivity of f is
GSf = max
x,y:d(x,y)=1
||f(x)− f(y)||
McSherry [40] defines the notion of stable transformations on a
database, which we will use later. Intuitively, a transformation is
stable if its privacy implications can be bounded.
Definition 3 (Global Stability). A transformation T : Dn → Dn
is c-stable if for x, y ∈ Dn such that d(x, y) = 1, d(T (x), T (y)) ≤
c.
Another definition of sensitivity is local sensitivity [22,44], which
is the maximum difference between the query’s results on the true
database and any neighbor of it:
Definition 4 (Local Sensitivity). For f : Dn → Rd and x ∈ Dn,
the local sensitivity of f at x is
LSf (x) = max
y:d(x,y)=1
||f(x)− f(y)||
Local sensitivity is often much lower than global sensitivity since
it is a property of the single true database rather than the set of all
possible databases.
We extend the notion of stability to the case of local sensitivity
by fixing x to be the true database.
Definition 5 (Local Stability). A transformation T : Dn → Dn
is locally c-stable for true database x if for y ∈ Dn such that
d(x, y) = 1, d(T (x), T (y)) ≤ c.
Differential privacy for multi-table databases. In this paper we
consider bounded differential privacy [36], in which x can be ob-
tained from its neighbor y by changing (but not adding or remov-
ing) a single tuple. Our setting involves a database represented as a
multiset of tuples, and we wish to protect the presence or absence
of a single tuple. If tuples are drawn from the domain D and the
database contains n tuples, the setting can be represented as a vec-
tor x ∈ Dn, in which xi = v if row i in the database contains the
tuple v.
For queries without joins, a database x ∈ Dn is considered as
a single table. However, our setting considers database with mul-
tiple tables and queries with joins. We map this setting into the
traditional definition of differential privacy by considering m ta-
bles t1, ..., tm as disjoint subsets of a single database x ∈ Dn, so
that
⋃m
i=1 ti = x.
With this mapping, differential privacy offers the same protec-
tion as in the single-table case: it protects the presence or absence
of any single tuple in the database. When a single user contributes
more than one protected tuple, however, protecting individual tu-
ples may not be sufficient to provide privacy. Note that this caveat
applies equally to the single- and multi-table cases—it is not a
unique problem of multi-table differential privacy.
We maintain the same definition of neighboring databases as the
single-table case. Neighbors of x ∈ Dn can be obtained by se-
lecting a table ti ∈ x and changing a single tuple, equivalent to
changing a single tuple in a single-table database.
Smoothing functions. Because local sensitivity is based on the
true database, it must be used carefully to avoid leaking informa-
tion about the data. Prior work [22, 44] describes techniques for
using local sensitivity to enforce differential privacy. Henceforth
we use the term smoothing functions to refer to these techniques.
Smoothing functions are independent of the method used to com-
pute local sensitivity, but generally require that local sensitivity can
be computed an arbitrary distance k from the true database (i.e.
when at most k entries are changed).
Definition 6 (Local Sensitivity at Distance). The local sensitivity
of f at distance k from database x is:
A
(k)
f (x) = max
y∈Dn:d(x,y)≤k
LSf (y)
3.3 Definition of Elastic Sensitivity
We define the elastic sensitivity of a query recursively on the
query’s structure. To allow the use of smoothing functions, our
definition describes how to calculate elastic sensitivity at arbitrary
distance k from the true database (under this definition, the local
sensitivity of the query is defined at k = 0).
Figure 1 contains the complete definition, which is in four parts:
(a) Core relational algebra, (b) Definition of Elastic sensitivity, (c)
Max frequency at distance k, and (d) Ancestors of a relation. We
describe each part next.
Core relational algebra. We present the formal definition of elas-
tic sensitivity in terms of a subset of the standard relational algebra,
defined in Figure 1(a). This subset includes selection (σ), projec-
tion (pi), join (./), counting (Count), and counting with grouping
(CountG1..Gn ). It admits arbitrary equijoins, including self joins,
and all join relationships (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-
many).
To simplify the presentation our notation assumes the query per-
forms a count as the outermost operation, however the approach
naturally extends to aggregations nested anywhere in the query
as long as the query does not perform arithmetic or other modi-
fications to aggregation result. For example, the following query
counts the total number of trips and projects the “count” attribute:
picountCount(trips)
Our approach can support this query by treating the inner relation
as the query root.
Elastic sensitivity. Figure 1(b) contains the recursive definition of
elastic sensitivity at distance k. We denote the elastic sensitivity of
query q at distance k from the true database x as Sˆ(k)(q, x). The
Sˆ function is defined in terms of the elastic stability of relational
transformations (denoted SˆR).
Sˆ
(k)
R (r, x) bounds the local stability (Definition 5) of relation r at
distance k from the true database x. Sˆ(k)R (r, x) is defined in terms
of mfk(a, r, x), the maximum frequency of attribute a in relation r
at distance k from database x.
Max frequency at distance k. The maximum frequency metric
is used to bound the sensitivity of joins. We define the maximum
frequencymf(a, r, x) as the frequency of the most frequent value of
attribute a in relation r in the database instance x. In Section 4 we
describe how the values of mf can be obtained from the database.
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To bound the local sensitivity of a query at distance k from the
true database, we must also bound the max frequency of each join
key at distance k from the true database. For attribute a of relation r
in the true database x, we denote this value mfk(a, r, x), and define
it (in terms of mf) in Figure 1(c).
Ancestors of a relation. The definition in Figure 1(d) is a for-
malization to identify self joins. Self joins have a much greater
effect on sensitivity than joins of non-overlapping relations. In a
self join, adding or removing one row of the underlying database
may cause changes in both joined relations, rather than just one or
the other. The join case of elastic sensitivity is therefore defined in
two cases: one for self joins, and one for joins of non-overlapping
relations. To distinguish the two cases, we use A(r) (defined in
Figure 1(d)), which denotes the set of tables possibly contributing
rows to r. A join of two relations r1 and r2 is a self join when r1
and r2 overlap, which occurs when some table t in the underlying
database contributes rows to both r1 and r2. Rows r1 and r2 are
non-overlapping when |A(r1) ∩ A(r2)| = 0.
Join conditions. For simplicity our notation refers only to the case
where a join contains a single equality predicate. However, the
approach naturally extends to join conditions containing any predi-
cate that can be decomposed into a conjunction of an equijoin term
and any other terms. Consider for example the following query:
SELECT COUNT (∗) FROM a
JOIN b ON a.id = b.id AND a.size > b.size
Calculation of elastic sensitivity for this query requires only the
equijoin term (a.id = b.id) and therefore follows directly from our
definition. Note that in a conjunction, each predicate adds addi-
tional constraints that may decrease (but never increase) the true
local stability of the join, hence our definition correctly computes
an upper bound on the stability.
Unsupported queries. We discuss several cases of queries that are
not supported by our definition in Section 3.7.1.
3.4 Example: Counting Triangles
We now consider step-by-step calculation of elastic sensitivity
for an example query. We select the problem of counting triangles
in a directed graph, described by Prosperio et al. in their evaluation
of WPINQ [47]. This example contains multiple self-joins, which
demonstrate the most complex recursive cases of Figure 1.
Following Prosperio et al. we select privacy budget  = 0.7 and
consider the ca-HepTh [6] dataset, which has maximum frequency
metric of 65.
In SQL, the query is expressed as:
SELECT COUNT (∗) FROM edges e1
JOIN edges e2 ON e1.dest = e2.source AND
e1.source < e2.source
JOIN edges e3 ON e2.dest = e3.source AND
e3.dest = e1.source AND
e2.source < e3.source
Consider the first join (e1 ./ e2), which joins the edges table
with itself. By definition of Sˆ(k)R (self join case) the elastic stability
of this relation is:
mfk(dest, edges, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (edges, x)+
mfk(source, edges, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (edges, x)+
Sˆ
(k)
R (edges, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (edges, x)
Furthermore, since edges is a table, Sˆ(k)R (edges) = 1.
We then have:
mfk(dest, edges, x) = mf(dest, edges, x) + k
mfk(source, edges, x) = mf(source, edges, x) + k
Substituting the max frequency metric (65), the elastic stability of
this relation is (65 + k) + (65 + k) + 1 = 131 + 2k.
Now consider the second join, which joins e3 (an alias for the
edges table) with the previous joined relation (e1 ./ e2). Follow-
ing the same process and substituting values, the elastic stability of
this relation is:
mfk(dest, edges, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (e1 ./ e2, x)+
mfk(source, edges, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (edges, x)+
Sˆ
(k)
R (e1 ./ e2, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (edges, x)
=(65 + k)(131 + 2k) + (65 + k) + (131 + 2k)
=2k
2
+ 199k + 8711
This expression describes the elastic stability at distance k of
relation (e1 ./ e2) ./ e3. Per the definition of Sˆ(k) the elastic
sensitivity of a counting query is equal to the elastic stability of the
relation being counted, therefore this expression defines the elastic
sensitivity of the full original query.
As we will discuss in Section 4.1, elastic sensitivity must be
smoothed using smooth sensitivity [44] before it can be used with
the Laplace mechanism. In short, this process requires computing
the maximum value of elastic sensitivity at k multiplied by an ex-
ponentially decaying function in k:
S = max
k=0,1,...,n
e
−βk
Sˆ
(k)
= max
k=0,1,...,n
e
−βk
(2k
2
+ 199k + 8711)
where β = 
2 ln(2/δ)
and δ = 10−8.
The maximum value is S = 8896.95, which occurs at distance
k = 19. Therefore, to enforce differential privacy we add Laplace
noise scaled to 2S

= 17793.9
0.7
, per Definition 7 (see Section 4.1).
3.5 Elastic Sensitivity is an Upper Bound on
Local Sensitivity
In this section, we prove that elastic sensitivity is an upper bound
on the local sensitivity of a query. This fundamental result affirms
the soundness of using elastic sensitivity in any local sensitivity-
based differential privacy mechanism. First, we prove two impor-
tant lemmas: one showing the correctness of the max frequency at
distance k, and the other showing the correctness of elastic stability.
Lemma 1. For database x, at distance k, r has at most mfk(a, r, x)
occurrences of the most popular join key in attribute a:
mfk(a, r, x) ≥ max
y:d(x,y)≤k
mf(a, r, y)
Proof. By induction on the structure of r.
Case t. To obtain the largest possible number of occurrences of the
most popular join key in a table t at distance k, we modify k rows to
contain the most popular join key. Thus, maxy:d(x,y)≤kmf(a, r, y) =
mf(a, r, x) + k.
Case r1 ./
a2=a3
r2. We need to show that:
mfk(a1, r1 ./
a2=a3
r2, x) ≥ max
y:d(x,y)≤k
mf(a1, r1 ./
a2=a3
r2, y) (1)
Consider the case when a1 ∈ r1 (the proof for case a1 ∈ r2 is
symmetric). The worst-case sensitivity occurs when each tuple in
r1 with the most popular value for a1 also contains attribute value
a2 matching the most popular value of attribute a3 in r2. So we
can rewrite equation 1:
mfk(a1, r1 ./
a2=a3
r2, x) ≥ max
y:d(x,y)≤k
mf(a1, r1, y)mf(a3, r2, y) (2)
We then rewrite the left-hand side, based on the definition of mfk
and the inductive hypothesis. Each step may make the left-hand
side smaller, but never larger, preserving the original inequality:
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Core relational algebra:
Attribute names
a
Value constants
v
Relational transformations
R ::= t | R1 ./
x=y
R2
| Πa1,...,anR | σϕR
| Count(R)
Selection predicates
ϕ ::= a1θa2 | aθv
θ ::= < | ≤ | =
| 6= | ≥ | >
Counting queries
Q ::= Count(R)
| Count
G1..Gn
(R)
Definition of elastic stability:
Sˆ
(k)
R :: R→ Dn→ elastic stability
Sˆ
(k)
R (t, x) = 1
Sˆ
(k)
R (r1 ./a=b
r2, x) =
max(mfk(a, r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x),
mfk(b, r2, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x)) |A(r1) ∩ A(r2)| = 0
mfk(a, r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x)+
mfk(b, r2, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x)+
Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x) |A(r1) ∩ A(r2)| > 0
Sˆ
(k)
R (Πa1,...,anr, x) = Sˆ
(k)
R (r, x)
Sˆ
(k)
R (σϕr, x) = Sˆ
(k)
R (r, x)
Sˆ
(k)
R (Count(r)) = 1
Definition of elastic sensitivity:
Sˆ(k) :: Q→ Dn→ elastic sensitivity
Sˆ(k)(Count(r), x) = Sˆ(k)R (r, x)
Sˆ(k)( Count
G1..Gn
(r), x) = 2Sˆ
(k)
R (r, x)
Maximum frequency at distance k:
mfk :: a→ R→ Dn→ N
mfk(a, t, x) = mf(a, t, x) + k
mfk(a1, r1 ./
a2=a3
r2, x) ={
mfk(a1, r1, x)mfk(a3, r2, x) a1 ∈ r1
mfk(a1, r2, x)mfk(a2, r1, x) a1 ∈ r2
mfk(a,Πa1,...,anr, x) = mfk(a, r, x)
mfk(a, σϕr, x) = mfk(a, r, x)
mfk(a,Count(r), x) = ⊥
(c)
Ancestors of a relation:
A :: R→ {R}
A(t) = {t}
A(r1 ./
a=b
r2) = A(r1) ∪ A(r2)
A(Πa1,...,anr) = A(r)A(σϕr) = A(r)
(a) (b) (d)
Figure 1: (a) syntax of core relational algebra; (b) definition of elastic stability and elastic sensitivity at distance k; (c) definition of
maximum frequency at distance k; (d) definition of ancestors of a relation.
mfk(a1, r1 ./
a2=a3
r2, x)
= mfk(a1, r1, x)mfk(a3, r2, x)
≥ max
y:d(x,y)≤k
mf(a1, r1, y) max
y:d(x,y)≤k
mf(a3, r2, y)
≥ max
y:d(x,y)≤k
mf(a1, r1, y)mf(a3, r2, y)
Which is equal to the right-hand side of equation 2.
Case Πa1,...,anr. Projection does not change the number of rows,
so the conclusion follows directly from the inductive hypothesis.
Case σϕr. Selection might filter out some rows, but does not mod-
ify attribute values. In the worst case, no rows are filtered out, so
σϕr has the same number of occurrences of the most popular join
key as r. The conclusion thus follows directly from the inductive
hypothesis.
Lemma 2. Sˆ(k)R (r) is an upper bound on the local stability of re-
lation expression r at distance k from database x:
A
(k)
count(r)(x) ≤ Sˆ
(k)
R (r, x)
Proof. By induction on the structure of r.
Case t. The stability of a table is 1, no matter its contents.
Case r1 ./
a=b
r2. We want to bound the number of changed rows in
the joined relation. There are two cases, depending on whether or
not the join is a self join.
Subcase 1: no self join. When the ancestors of r1 and r2 are non-
overlapping (i.e. |A(r1) ∩ A(r2)| = 0), then the join is not a self
join. This means that either r1 may change or r2 may change, but
not both. As a result, either Sˆ(k)R (r1, x) = 0 or Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x) = 0.
We therefore have two cases:
1. When Sˆ(k)R (r1, x) = 0, r2 may contain at most Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x)
changed rows, producing at mostmfk(a, r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x) changed
rows in the joined relation.
2. In the symmetric case, when Sˆ(k)R (r2, x) = 0, the joined rela-
tion contains at most mfk(b, r2, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x) changed rows.
We choose to modify the relation resulting in the largest number of
changed rows, which is exactly the definition.
Subcase 2: self join. When the set of ancestor tables of r1 overlaps
with the set of ancestor tables of r2, i.e. |A(r1)∩A(r2)| > 0, then
changing a single row in the database could result in changed rows
in both r1 and r2.
In the self join case, there are three sources of changed rows:
1. The join key of an original row from r1 could match the join
key of a changed row in r2.
2. The join key of an original row from r2 could match the join
key of a changed row in r1.
3. The join key of a changed row from r1 could match the join key
of a changed row in r2.
Now consider how many changed rows could exist in each class.
1. In class 1, r2 could have at most Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x) changed rows
(by the inductive hypothesis). In the worst case, each of these
changed rows matches the most popular join key in r1, which
occurs at most mfk(a, r1, x) times (by Lemma 1), so class 1
contains at most mfk(a, r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x) changed rows.
2. Class 2 is the symmetric case of class 1, and thus contains at
most mfk(b, r2, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x) changed rows.
3. In class 3, we know that r1 contains at most Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x) changed
rows and r2 contains at most Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x) changed rows. In
the worst case, all of these changed rows contain the same join
key, and so the joined relation contains Sˆ(k)R (r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x)
changed rows.
The total number of changed rows is therefore bounded by the sum
of the bounds on the three classes:
mfk(a, r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x)+mfk(b, r2, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x)+
Sˆ
(k)
R (r1, x)Sˆ
(k)
R (r2, x)
Which is exactly the definition.
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Case Πa1,...,anr. Projection does not change rows. The conclusion
therefore follows from the inductive hypothesis.
Case σϕr. Selection does not change rows. The conclusion there-
fore follows from the inductive hypothesis.
Case Count(r). Count without grouping produces a relation with
a single row. The stability of such a relation is 1, at any distance.
Main theorem. We are now prepared to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 1. The elastic sensitivity Sˆ(k)(q, x) of a query q at dis-
tance k from the true database x is an upper bound on the local
sensitivity A(k)q (x) of q executed at distance k from database x:
A
(k)
q (x) ≤ Sˆ(k)(q, x)
Proof. There are two cases: histogram queries and non-histogram
queries.
Case Count(r) (non-histogram). The local sensitivity of a non-
histogram counting query over r is equal to the stability of r, so the
result follows directly from Lemma 2.
Case Count
G1..Gn
(r) (histogram). In a histogram query, each changed
row in the underlying relation can change two rows in the his-
togram [23]. Thus by Lemma 2, the histogram’s local stability is
bounded by 2Sˆ(k)R (r, x).
3.6 Optimization for Public Tables
Our definition of elastic sensitivity assumes that all database re-
cords must be protected. In practice, databases often contain a mix-
ture of sensitive and non-sensitive data. This fact can be used to
tighten our bound on local sensitivity for queries joining on non-
sensitive tables.
In our dataset, for example, city data is publicly known, therefore
the system does not need to protect against an attacker learning
information about the cities table. Note the set of public tables is
domain-specific and will vary in each data environment.
More precisely, in a join expression T1 JOIN T2 ON T1.A = T2.B,
if T2 is publicly known, the elastic stability of the join is equal to
the elastic stability of T1 times the maximum frequency of T2.B.
This formulation prevents the use of a publicly-known table with
repeated join keys from revealing information about a private table.
3.7 Discussion of Limitations and Extensions
This section discusses limitations of elastic sensitivity and po-
tential extensions to support other common aggregation functions.
3.7.1 Unsupported Queries
Elastic sensitivity does not support non-equijoins, and adding
support for these is not straightforward. Consider the query:
SELECT count (∗) FROM A JOIN B ON A.x > B.y
This query compares join keys using the greater-than operator, and
bounding the number of matches for this comparison would require
knowledge about all the data for A.x and B.y.
Fortunately, as demonstrated in our empirical study, more than
three-quarters of joins are equijoins. Elastic sensitivity could be
extended to support other join types by querying the database for
necessary data-dependent bounds, but this modification would re-
quire interactions with the database for each original query.
Elastic sensitivity can also fail when requisite max-frequency
metrics are not available due to the query structure. Consider the
query:
WITH A AS (SELECT count (∗) FROM T1),
B AS (SELECT count (∗) FROM T2)
SELECT count (∗) FROM A JOIN B ON A.count = B.count
This query uses counts computed in subqueries as join keys. Be-
cause the mf metric covers only the attributes available in the orig-
inal tables of the database, our approach cannot bound the sensi-
tivity of this query and must reject it. In general, elastic sensitivity
applies only when join keys are drawn directly from original tables.
Fortunately, this criterion holds for 98.5% of joins in our dataset,
so this limitation has very little consequence in practice.
3.7.2 Supporting Other Aggregation Functions
In this section we outline possible extensions of our approach to
support non-count aggregation functions, and characterize the ex-
pected utility for each. These extensions, which provide a roadmap
for potential future research, would expand the set of queries sup-
ported by an elastic sensitivity-based system.
Value range metric. To describe these extensions we define a new
metric, value range vr(a, r), defined as the maximum value mi-
nus the minimum value allowed by the data model of column a in
relation r.
This metric can be derived in a few ways. First, it can be ex-
tracted automatically from the database’s column constraint defini-
tions [2], if they exist. Second, a SQL query can extract the current
value range, which can provide a guideline for selecting the permis-
sible value range based on records already in the database; finally,
a domain expert can define the metric using knowledge about the
data’s semantics.
Once the metric is defined, it must be enforced in order for dif-
ferential privacy to be guaranteed. The metric could be enforced
as a data integrity check, for example using column check con-
straints [2].
Sum and Average. For sum and average, we note that the local
sensitivity of these functions is affected both by the stability of the
underlying relation, because each row of the relation potentially
contributes to the computed sum or average, and by the range of
possible values of the attributes involved.
Given our definition of vr above, the elastic sensitivity of both
Sum and Average on relation r at distance k from database x is
defined by vr(a, r)S(k)R (r, x). This expression captures the largest
possible change in local sensitivity, in which each new row in r has
the maximum value of a, for a total change of vr(a, r) per row.
For Sum queries on relations with stability 1 (i.e. relations with-
out joins), this definition of elastic sensitivity is exactly equal to
the query’s local sensitivity, so the approach will provide optimal
utility. As the relation’s stability grows, so does the gap between
elastic sensitivity and local sensitivity, and utility degrades, since
elastic sensitivity makes the worst-case assumption that each row
duplicated by a join contains the maximum value allowed by the
data model.
For the average function, this definition is exactly equal to local
sensitivity only for the degenerate case of averages of a single row.
As more input rows are added, local sensitivity shrinks, since the
impact of a single new row is amortized over the number of aver-
aged records, while elastic sensitivity remains constant. Therefore
utility degradation is proportional to both the stability of the rela-
tion as well as the number of records being averaged.
This could be mitigated with a separate analysis to compute a
lower bound on the number of records being averaged, in which
case the sensitivity could be scaled down by this factor. Such an
analysis would require inspection of filter conditions in the query
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Figure 2: Architecture of FLEX.
and an expanded set of database metrics.
Max and min. We observe that the stability of the underlying re-
lation has no effect on the local sensitivity of max and min. Conse-
quently, for such queries the data model vr(a, r) directly provides
the global sensitivity, which is an upper bound of local sensitiv-
ity. However, the max and min functions are inherently sensitive,
because they are strongly affected by outliers in the database [22],
and therefore any differential privacy technique will provide poor
utility in the general case.
Due to this fundamental limitation, previous work [22, 44, 50]
has focused on the robust counterparts of these functions, such as
the interquartile range, which are less sensitive to changes in the
database. This strategy is not viable in our setting since functions
like interquartile range are not supported by standard SQL.
4. FLEX: PRACTICAL DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY FOR SQL QUERIES
This section describes FLEX, our system to enforce differential
privacy for SQL queries using elastic sensitivity. Figure 2 sum-
marizes the architecture of our system. For a given SQL query,
FLEX uses an analysis of the query to calculate its elastic sensitiv-
ity, as described in Section 3. FLEX then applies smooth sensitiv-
ity [44, 45] to the elastic sensitivity and finally adds noise drawn
from the Laplace distribution to the original query results. In Sec-
tion 4.1 we prove this approach provides (, δ)-differential privacy.
Importantly, our approach allows the query to execute on any ex-
isting database. FLEX requires only static analysis of the query and
post-processing of the query results, and requires no interactions
with the database to enforce differential privacy. As we demon-
strate in Section 5, this design allows the approach to scale to big
data while incurring minimal performance overhead.
Collecting max frequency metrics. The definition of elastic sen-
sitivity requires a set of precomputed metrics mf from the database,
defined as the frequency of the most frequent attribute for each join
key. The values of mf can be easily obtained with a SQL query. For
example, this query retrieves the metric for column a of table T :
SELECT COUNT(a) FROM T GROUP BY a
ORDER BY count DESC LIMIT 1;
Obtaining these metrics is a separate step from enforcing differ-
ential privacy for a query; the metrics can be obtained once and
re-used for all queries. Note the metric must be recomputed when
the most frequent join attribute changes, otherwise differential pri-
vacy is no longer guaranteed. For this reason, the architecture in
Figure 2 is ideal for environments where database updates are far
less frequent than database queries.
Most databases can be configured using triggers [3] to automat-
ically recompute the metrics on database updates; this approach
could support environments with frequent data updates.
Elastic Sensitivity analysis. To compute elastic sensitivity we
built an analysis framework for SQL queries based on the Presto
parser [9], with additional logic to resolve aliases and a frame-
work to perform abstract interpretation-based dataflow analyses on
the query tree. FLEX’s elastic sensitivity analysis is built on this
dataflow analysis engine, and propagates information about ances-
tor relations and max-frequency metrics for each joined column in
order to compute the overall elastic sensitivity of the query, per the
recursive definition in Section 3. We evaluate the runtime and suc-
cess rate of this analysis in Section 5.
Histogram bin enumeration. When a query uses SQL’s GROUP BY
construct, the output is a histogram containing a set of bin labels
and an aggregation result (e.g., count) for each bin. To simplify
presentation, our definition of elastic sensitivity in Section 3.3 as-
sumes that the analyst provides the desired histogram bins labels `.
This requirement, also adopted by previous work [40], is necessary
to prevent leaking information via the presence or absence of a bin.
In practice, however, analysts do not expect to provide histogram
bin labels manually.
In some cases, FLEX can automatically build the set of histogram
bin labels ` for a given query. In our dataset, many histogram
queries use non-protected bin labels drawn from finite domains
(e.g. city names or product types). For each possible value of the
histogram bin label, FLEX can automatically build ` and obtain the
corresponding differentially private count for that histogram bin.
Then, FLEX adds a row to the output containing the bin label and
its differentially private count, where results for missing bins are
assigned value 0 and noise added as usual.
This process returns a histogram of the expected form which
does not reveal anything new through the presence or absence of
a bin. Additionally, since this process requires the bin labels to be
non-protected, the original bin labels can be returned. The process
can generalize to any aggregation function.
This process requires a finite, enumerable, and non-protected set
of values for each histogram bin label. When the requirement can-
not be met, for example because the histogram bin labels are pro-
tected or cannot be enumerated, FLEX can still return the differen-
tially private count for each bin, but it must rely on the analyst to
specify the bin labels.
4.1 Proof of Correctness
In this section we formally define the FLEX mechanism and prove
that it provides (, δ)-differential privacy.
FLEX implements the following differential privacy mechanism
derived from the Laplace-based smooth sensitivity mechanism de-
fined by Nissim et al. [44, 45]:
Definition 7 (FLEX mechanism). For input query q and histogram
bin labels ` on true database x of size n, with privacy parameters
(, δ):
1. Set β = 
2 ln(2/δ)
.
2. Calculate S = maxk=0,1,...,n e−βkSˆ(k)(q, x).
3. Release q`(x) + Lap(2S/).
This mechanism leverages smooth sensitivity [44,45], using elastic
sensitivity as an upper bound on local sensitivity.
Theorem 2. The FLEX mechanism provides (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy.
Proof. By Theorem 1 and Nissim et al. [45] Lemma 2.3, S is a β-
smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity of q. By Nissim et al.
Lemma 2.9, when the Laplace mechanism is used, a setting of β =

2 ln(2/δ)
suffices to provide (, δ)-differential privacy. By Nissim
et al. Corollary 2.4, the value released by the FLEX mechanism is
(, δ)-differentially private.
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4.2 Efficiently Calculating S
The definition of the FLEX mechanism (Definition 7) requires
(in step 2) calculating the maximum smooth sensitivity over all dis-
tances k between 0 and n (the size of the true database). For large
databases, this is inefficient, even if each sensitivity calculation is
very fast.
The particular combination of elastic sensitivity with smooth sen-
sitivity allows for an optimization. The elastic sensitivity Sˆ(k)(q, x)
grows as kj(q)
2
, where j(q) is the number of joins in q (see Lemma 3
below). For a given query, j(q) is fixed. The smoothing factor
(e−βk), on the other hand, shrinks exponentially in k.
Recall that the smoothed-out elastic sensitivity at k is S(k) =
e−βkSˆ(k)(q, x). We will show that to find maxk=0,1,...,n S(k), it
is sufficient to find maxk=0,1,...,m S(k), where m ≥ j(q)
2
β
. Since
m is typically much smaller than n (and depends on the query,
rather than the size of the database), this observation yields signifi-
cant computational savings.
Lemma 3. For all relation expressions r and databases x, where
j(r) is the number of joins in r, Sˆ(k)R (r, x) is a polynomial in k of
degree at most j(r)2, and all coefficients are non-negative.
Proof. Follows from the recursive definitions of Sˆ(k)R and mfk,
since each makes at most j(r) recursive calls and only adds or mul-
tiplies the results.
Theorem 3. For all queries q and databases x, the smoothed-out
elastic sensitivity at distance k is S(k) = e−βkSˆ(k)(q, x). For
each x and q, if q queries a relation r, the maximum value of S(k)
occurs from k = 0 to k = j(r)
2
β
.
Proof. Let the constant λ = j(r)2. By Lemma 3, we have that for
some set of constants α0, . . . αλ:
Sˆ
(k)
R (r, x) =
λ∑
i=0
αik
λ−i
We therefore have that:
S(k) =
∑λ
i=0 αik
λ−i
eβk
S′(k) =
λ∑
i=0
αie
βkkλ−i−1(λ− i− βk)
Under the condition that αi ≥ 0, each term in the numerator is
≤ 0 exactly when λ − i − βk ≤ 0. We know that αi ≥ 0 by the
definition of elastic sensitivity.
We also know that λ ≥ 0, because a query cannot have a negative
number of joins. Thus the first term (i = 0) is ≤ 0 exactly when
k ≥ λ
β
(we know that β ≥ 0 by its definition). All of the other
terms will also be≤ 0 when k ≥ λ
β
, because for i > 0, λ−i−βk <
λ− βk.
We can therefore conclude that S′(k) ≤ 0 when k > λ
β
, and so
S(k) is flat or decreasing for k > j(r)
2
β
.
4.3 Privacy Budget & Multiple Queries
FLEX does not prescribe a specific privacy budget management
strategy, allowing the use existing privacy budget methods as needed
Table 2: Performance of FLEX-based differential privacy.
Avg (s) Max (s)
Original query 42.4 3,452
FLEX: Elastic Sensitivity Analysis 0.007 1.2
FLEX: Output Perturbation 0.005 2.4
for specific applications. Below we provide a brief overview of sev-
eral approaches.
Composition techniques. Composition for differential privacy [23]
provides a simple way to support multiple queries: the s and δs for
these queries simply add up until they reach a maximum allowable
budget, at which point the system refuses to answer new queries.
The strong composition theorem [26] improves on this method to
produce a tighter bound on the privacy budget used. Both ap-
proaches are independent of the mechanism and thus apply directly
to FLEX.
Budget-efficient approaches. Several approaches answer multiple
queries together (i.e. in a single workload) resulting in more effi-
cient use of a given privacy budget than simple composition tech-
niques. These approaches work by posing counting queries through
a low-level differentially private interface to the database. FLEX
can provide the low-level interface to support these approaches.
The sparse vector technique [24] answers only queries whose
results lie above a predefined threshold. This approach depletes
the privacy budget for answered queries only. The Matrix Mecha-
nism [37] and MWEM [30] algorithms build an approximation of
the true database using differentially private results from the under-
lying mechanism; the approximated database is then used to answer
questions in the workload. Ding et al. [19] use a similar approach
to release differentially private data cubes. Each of these mecha-
nisms is defined in terms of the Laplace mechanism and thus can
be implemented using FLEX.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate our approach with the following experiments:
• We measure the performance overhead and success rate of FLEX
on real-world queries (Section 5.1).
• We investigate the utility of FLEX-based differential privacy for
real-world queries with and without joins (Section 5.2).
• We evaluate the effect of the privacy budget  on the utility of
FLEX-based differential privacy (Section 5.3).
• We measure the utility impact of the public table optimization
described in Section 3.6 (Section 5.4).
• We compare FLEX and wPINQ on a set of representative count-
ing queries using join (Section 5.5).
Experimental setup & dataset. We ran all of our experiments us-
ing our implementation of FLEX with Java 8 on Mac OSX. Our
test machine was equipped with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 and 8GB
of memory. Our experiment dataset includes 9862 real queries ex-
ecuted during October 2016. To build this dataset, we identified
all counting queries (including histogram queries) submitted dur-
ing this time which examined sensitive trip data. Our dataset also
includes original results for each of these queries.
5.1 Success Rate and Performance of FLEX
To investigate FLEX’s support for the wide range of SQL features
in real-world queries, we ran FLEX’s elastic sensitivity analysis on
the queries in our experiment dataset. We recorded the number of
errors and classified each error according to its type.
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Figure 3: Distribution of population sizes for dataset queries.
In total, FLEX successfully calculated elastic sensitivity for 76%
of the queries. The largest group of errors is due to unsupported
queries (14.14%). These queries use features for which our ap-
proach cannot compute an elastic sensitivity, as described in Sec-
tion 3.7.1. Parsing errors occurred for 6.58% of queries. These er-
rors result from incomplete grammar definitions for the full set of
SQL dialects used by the queries, and could be fixed by expanding
Presto parser’s grammar definitions. The remaining errors (3.21%)
are due to other causes.
To investigate the performance of FLEX-based differential pri-
vacy, we measured the total execution time of the architecture de-
scribed in Figure 2 compared with the original query execution
time. We report the results in Table 2. Parsing and analysis of
the query to calculate elastic sensitivity took an average of 7.03
milliseconds per query. The output perturbation step added an ad-
ditional 4.86 milliseconds per query. By contrast, the average data-
base execution time was 42.4 seconds per query, implying an aver-
age performance overhead of 0.03%.
5.2 Utility of FLEX on Real-World Queries
Our work is the first to evaluate differential privacy on a set of
real-world queries executed on real data. In contrast with previous
evaluations of differential privacy [15, 32, 33], our dataset includes
a wide variety of real queries executed on real data.
We evaluate the behavior of FLEX for this broad range of queries.
Specifically, we measure the noise introduced to query results based
on whether or not the query uses join and what percentage of the
data is accessed by the query.
Query population size. To evaluate the ability of FLEX to handle
both small and large populations, we define a metric called popu-
lation size. The population size of a query is the number of unique
trips in the database used to calculate the query results. The pop-
ulation size metric quantifies the extent to which a query targets
specific users or trips: a low population size indicates the query
is highly targeted, while a higher population size means the query
returns statistics over a larger subgroup of records.
Figure 3 summarizes the distribution of population sizes of the
queries in our dataset. Our dataset contains queries with a wide
variety of population sizes, reflecting the diversity of queries in the
dataset.
Utility of FLEX-based differential privacy. We evaluate the util-
ity of FLEX by comparing the error introduced by differential pri-
vacy on each query against the population size of that query. For
small population sizes, we expect our approach to protect privacy
by producing high error; for large population sizes, we expect our
approach to provide high utility by producing low error.
We used FLEX to produce differentially private results for each
query in our dataset. We report separately the results for queries
with no joins and those with joins. For each cell in the results,
we calculated the relative (percent) error introduced by FLEX, as
compared to the true (non-private) results. Then, we calculated the
median error of the query by taking the median of the error values
of all cells. For this experiment, we set  = 0.1 and δ = n− lnn
(where n is the size of the database), following Dwork and Lei [22].
Table 3: Evaluated TPC-H queries.
Query Description # Joins
Q1 Billed, shipped, and returned business 0
Q4 Priority system status and customer satisfaction 0
Q13 Relationship between customers and order size 1
Q16 Suppliers capable of supplying various part types 1
Q21 Suppliers with late shipping times for required parts 3
Figure 4 shows the median error of each query against the popu-
lation size of that query for queries with no joins (a) and with joins
(b). The results indicate that FLEX achieves its primary goal of
supporting joins. Figure 4 shows similar trends with and without
joins. In both cases the median error generally decreases with in-
creasing population size; furthermore, the magnitude of the error is
comparable for both. Overall, FLEX provides high utility (less than
10% error) for a majority of queries both with and without joins.
Figure 4(b) shows a cluster of queries with higher errors but
exhibiting the same error-population size correlation as the main
group. The queries in this cluster perform many-to-many joins on
private tables and do not benefit from the public table optimization
described in Section 3.6. Even with this upward shift, a high util-
ity is predicted for sufficiently large population size: at population
sizes larger than 5 million the median error drops below 10%.
Hay et al. [32] define the term scale- exchangeability to de-
scribe the trend of decreasing error with increasing population size.
The practical implication of this property is that a desired utility
can always be obtained by using a sufficiently large population
size. For counting queries, a local sensitivity-based mechanism
using Laplace noise is expected to exhibit scale- exchangeability.
Our results provide empirical confirmation that FLEX preserves this
property, for both queries with and without joins, while calculating
an approximation of local sensitivity.
5.2.1 Utility of FLEX on TPC-H benchmark
We repeat our utility experiment using TPC-H [17], an industry-
standard SQL benchmark. The source code and data for this exper-
iment are available for download [5].
The TPC-H benchmark includes synthetic data and queries sim-
ulating a workload for an archetypal industrial company. The data
is split across 8 tables (customers, orders, suppliers, etc.) and the
benchmark includes 22 SQL queries on these tables.
The TPC-H benchmark is useful for evaluating our system since
the queries are specifically chosen to exhibit a high degree of com-
plexity and to model typical business decisions [17]. This experi-
ment measures the ability of our system to handle complex queries
and provide high utility in a new domain.
Experiment setup. We populated a database using the TPC-H data
generation tool with the default scale factor of 1. We selected the
counting queries from the TPC-H query workload, resulting in five
queries for evaluation including three queries that use join. The
selected queries use SQL’s GROUP BY operator and other SQL
features including filters, order by, and subqueries. The selected
queries are summarized in Table 3. The remaining queries in the
benchmark are not applicable for this experiment as they return raw
data or use non-counting aggregation functions.
We computed the median population size and median error for
each query using the same methodology as the previous experiment
and privacy parameters  = 0.1 and δ = n− lnn. We marked
as private every table containing customer or supplier information
(customer, orders, lineitem, supplier, partsupp). The 3 tables con-
taining non-sensitive metadata (region, nation, part) were marked
as public.
Results. The results are presented in Figure 5. Elastic sensitivity
11
0.0001
  0.001
    0.01
      0.1
      1
    10
   100
1,000
10,000
1 100 10,000 1,000,000 100,000,000
COUNT
1 100 10,000 1,000,000 100,000,000
Coverage Error PermalinkId ColIndex IsHistogram NumJoins AggregationFuncti
on
UniqueOptimized PublicTableOptimi
zed
COUNT-NOJOIN SUM-NOJOIN MIN-NOJOIN MAX-NOJOIN COUNT-JOIN SUM-JOIN MIN-JOIN MAX-JOIN
4 1000.0000 7ASpHpaXyx 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 1000.0000
4 500.0000 7ASpHpaXyx 3 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 500.0000
476 4.0404 7AbOSrvWt4 0 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 4.0404
4316970 0.0020 7CZ2hc4LQA 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0020
4316970 0.0098 7CZ2hc4LQA 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0098
4316970 0.0348 7CZ2hc4LQA 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0348
4316970 0.0132 7CZ2hc4LQA 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0132
227 179438.8861 7EZYJb84B1 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 179438.8861
51510 0.0194 7H9rkgCitV 2 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0194
51510 0.2537 7H9rkgCitV 3 FALSE 0 SUM null FALSE 0.2537
94883.5 0.0211 7HNc779LqC 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0211
94883.5 0.0255 7HNc779LqC 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0255
2948 0.3392 7I74vfvk8T 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.3392
1865182 0.0011 7Jg3Ss9WPR 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0011
21 95.2381 7KdH3rGVIm 5 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 95.2381
27794 0.0744 7Kmddvtd0d 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0744
20055816 0.0002 7MY4p5Ak6M 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0002
4618 0.7890 7NQ1sH20kL 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.7890
35 970150.0606 7OHYuUuqNP 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 970150.0606
125348 0.1844 7Pan3VZlYc 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.1844
125348 0.1844 7Pan3VZlYc 1 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.1844
2 33602901728642.8
000
7PrpoiFe0Q 6 TRUE 4 COUNT null TRUE 33602901728642.8
000
2 4178932808981280
0000000000000000
000000.0000
7PrpoiFe0Q 7 TRUE 4 SUM null TRUE 4178932808981280
0000000000000000
000000.0000
1503243 0.0015 7RpvMskSzK 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0015
1503243 0.0049 7RpvMskSzK 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0049
1503243 0.0026 7RpvMskSzK 3 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0026
1503243 5927.7004 7RpvMskSzK 4 TRUE 0 NONE null FALSE
14 237954.7103 7SEbib5byn 1 TRUE 3 COUNT null FALSE 237954.7103
1337050 0.0015 7UHXNJx1mu 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0015
1337050 8090.8355 7UHXNJx1mu 2 TRUE 0 NONE null FALSE
1337050 46011.8494 7UHXNJx1mu 3 TRUE 0 AVG null FALSE
31441 0.0646 7YEaz5mOyn 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0646
19 7520913.7466 7Z0T0CTGWn 2 TRUE 2 COUNT null FALSE 7520913.7466
44780.5 0.1870 7Z3J3Z628y 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.1870
7926.5 9622.2659 7Zf5hLFOn8 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 9622.2659
75 18.6916 7o6abcrSW2 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 18.6916
120215 2115.5499 7ovIHhF0T3 0 FALSE 2 COUNT null FALSE 2115.5499
120215 1376.6941 7ovIHhF0T3 1 FALSE 2 COUNT null FALSE 1376.6941
2 62363131.3057 7qzvcLDKKh 1 TRUE 2 COUNT null FALSE 62363131.3057
91 320189.9851 7rx8mPEnEJ 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 320189.9851
4 7775285.6972 7sRtZE9Jm9 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 7775285.6972
10762.5 0.4552 7tAURoNXHK 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.4552
10762.5 6825395723679380
0000000000.0000
7tAURoNXHK 2 TRUE 1 AVG null TRUE
10762.5 1566481949223230
0000000.0000
7tAURoNXHK 4 TRUE 1 SUM null TRUE 1566481949223230
0000000.0000
10762.5 0.5442 7tAURoNXHK 7 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.5442
10762.5 0.6388 7tAURoNXHK 8 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.6388
10762.5 1.9030 7tAURoNXHK 9 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 1.9030
3531004 0.0006 7tjSxJEHAz 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0006
3531004 0.0006 7tjSxJEHAz 2 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 0.0006
3531004 0.0928 7tjSxJEHAz 3 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 0.0928
3531004 0.0658 7tjSxJEHAz 4 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 0.0658
56 35.7143 7uJUfB3950 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 35.7143
297 6.2698 7vBRiNx4t1 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 6.2698
2 15812536.3442 7wfC5YUbOK 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 15812536.3442
55776 0.0359 7yAqVPZOMM 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0359
13 153.8462 7yAqWBG710 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 153.8462
13 5890538800568690
0000000000.0000
7yAqWBG710 2 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 5890538800568690
0000000000.0000
834 9.5328 7yX9nwJ1SS 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 9.5328
834 4327309434033440
00000000000.0000
7yX9nwJ1SS 5 TRUE 1 AVG null TRUE
834 146.6204 7yX9nwJ1SS 6 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 146.6204
834 42993.5845 7yX9nwJ1SS 7 TRUE 1 NONE null TRUE
712100 0.0323 7ygyyqhIu1 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.0323
712100 0.0114 7ygyyqhIu1 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.0114
712100 11470.9723 7ygyyqhIu1 3 TRUE 1 NONE null FALSE
4582933 0.0006 7zjROAwbn8 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0006
6784 0.2948 8072litR5x 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.2948
54 3428814013146080
00.0000
81dbFAZlDI 2 TRUE 5 COUNT null TRUE 3428814013146080
00.0000
54 1195702759369180
00.0000
81dbFAZlDI 5 TRUE 5 COUNT null FALSE 1195702759369180
00.0000
1 8131.3932 81iRN9sqg4 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 8131.3932
1 8131.3932 81iRN9sqg4 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 8131.3932
73126619 0.0008 83McNffr6Z 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0008
73126619 0.0002 83McNffr6Z 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0002
1.97675E+04 0.1065 85SPmqMWQD 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.1065
5125 0.4351 86F6jeq9Yv 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.4351
823553 377.6584 86fxNqaBiD 0 FALSE 2 COUNT null TRUE 377.6584
8.23553E+05 334.6522 86fxNqaBiD 1 FALSE 2 COUNT null TRUE 334.6522
9998425 0.0002 87FzwcOzpJ 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0002
338 5.9172 87TLNxQlo3 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 5.9172
28.5 67.8161 87TLOtgmiO 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 67.8161
4889 0.4437 87lH8WMXRc 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.4437
23 132493.0477 87oxckzdxT 1 TRUE 3 COUNT null FALSE 132493.0477
19515.5 4607.0670 8AikhgIcrM 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 4607.0670
19515.5 8908.4644 8AikhgIcrM 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 8908.4644
19515.5 56796668.7546 8AikhgIcrM 3 TRUE 1 NONE null FALSE
19515.5 9631.6012 8AikhgIcrM 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 9631.6012
19515.5 59523910.3151 8AikhgIcrM 5 TRUE 1 NONE null FALSE
166355.5 598.3816 8BrjG3gPWO 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 598.3816
24028142 0.0004 8C2eoF5qJf 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0004
24028142 1642642947180910
00000.0000
8C2eoF5qJf 2 TRUE 1 SUM null TRUE 1642642947180910
00000.0000
95 601052.2314 8CD97Cd96h 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 601052.2314
0 Infinity 8Dv6bCK1WB 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE Infinity
34023 0.0622 8GTehKtDeh 2 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0622
34023 Infinity 8GTehKtDeh 3 FALSE 0 SUM null FALSE Infinity
7 4382340.8732 8Gftvnkg8J 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 4382340.8732
7 5495820.2472 8Gftvnkg8J 5 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 5495820.2472
7 Infinity 8Gftvnkg8J 6 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE Infinity
7 30823754.1768 8Gftvnkg8J 7 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 30823754.1768
7 Infinity 8Gftvnkg8J 8 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE Infinity
7 5224303700741060
000000000000000.
0000
8Gftvnkg8J 9 TRUE 1 SUM null FALSE 5224303700741060
000000000000000.
0000
3495 2.1382 8GqPKds5R1 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 2.1382
3 9886045.4533 8HTHvuIqeR 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 9886045.4533
3 13291604.1509 8HTHvuIqeR 5 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 13291604.1509
3 Infinity 8HTHvuIqeR 6 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE Infinity
3 Infinity 8HTHvuIqeR 7 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE Infinity
3 Infinity 8HTHvuIqeR 8 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE Infinity
3 1236832679950620
0000000000000000
.0000
8HTHvuIqeR 9 TRUE 1 SUM null FALSE 1236832679950620
0000000000000000
.0000
33428 0.0459 8HlCQUoVsr 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0459
33428 0.0898 8HlCQUoVsr 3 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0898
33428 1084.5373 8HlCQUoVsr 4 TRUE 0 NONE null FALSE
297 6.7340 8HriWsWodZ 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 6.7340
1 2000.0000 8IgpXxF99l 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 2000.0000
234.5 6161928.9263 8JmzhcXIb6 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 6161928.9263
234.5 171240.6589 8JmzhcXIb6 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 171240.6589
130931 1983.1259 8N4zO41YIW 0 FALSE 2 COUNT null FALSE 1983.1259
130931 1109.6817 8N4zO41YIW 1 FALSE 2 COUNT null FALSE 1109.6817
1 31916572.6555 8NIkAvPSpF 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 31916572.6555
27137 2159.2687 8NafUmvqr8 0 FALSE 1 COUNT null FALSE 2159.2687
27137 16285.2522 8NafUmvqr8 1 FALSE 1 COUNT null FALSE 16285.2522
14159 0.5185 8OOtUtRs4g 0 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.5185
477 2.4115 8ORjXCjybc 3 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 2.4115
332.5 24.6760 8OjfieVDO2 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 24.6760
2058.5 1.0083 8PjIx9KVq3 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 1.0083
39596 2513.9975 8QBe5FO6SI 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 2513.9975
57162943 0.0002 8QhlH5ywBZ 0 FALSE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0002
57162943 0.0116 8QhlH5ywBZ 1 FALSE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0116
57162943 0.0006 8QhlH5ywBZ 2 FALSE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.0006
57162943 6276489784036700
0000.0000
8QhlH5ywBZ 3 FALSE 1 SUM null TRUE 6276489784036700
0000.0000
5693 0.3746 8R0MzGyQcI 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.3746
34606 0.0612 8SW2U7jS4z 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0612
34606 4059679920367400
0000000.0000
8SW2U7jS4z 2 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 4059679920367400
0000000.0000
16 129.5547 8UuAOLv5a0 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 129.5547
16 6295840110757340
0000000000.0000
8UuAOLv5a0 2 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 6295840110757340
0000000000.0000
15508 0.5020 8VpnUepDNE 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.5020
26306.5 0.3184 8VxU5ETm69 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.3184
1180077 0.0018 8WPpEv4aiK 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0018
2 15343607.0766 8XEwEzPgny 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 15343607.0766
10 3207447.3388 8ZTFnzdAWN 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 3207447.3388
188064 0.0704 8Zu6RUReOR 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.0704
188064 0.1527 8Zu6RUReOR 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.1527
188064 0.0438 8Zu6RUReOR 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.0438
188064 0.1696 8Zu6RUReOR 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.1696
84286 0.0237 8Zu6Svf2Al 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0237
84286 0.1501 8Zu6Svf2Al 2 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.1501
29128 0.3961 8bECmPQwjm 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.3961
29128 1.5583 8bECmPQwjm 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 1.5583
29128 0.2792 8bECmPQwjm 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.2792
29128 1.5935 8bECmPQwjm 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 1.5935
502710.5 0.0040 8bSOE57nPf 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0040
12 2466445.4883 8bw6bNEHEa 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 2466445.4883
15964.5 0.2529 8cKLI9G9wc 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.2529
1864.5 0.3166 8ctJmCdErH 0 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.3166
56655.5 0.1402 8dLeUbwN5y 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.1402
796633 92.8322 8dowt24P2Q 0 FALSE 1 COUNT null FALSE 92.8322
45269 0.1690 8ducBmK18K 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.1690
28154 0.3270 8dzSH8ybbB 7 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.3270
310 3.9841 8eAlUQfsvy 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 3.9841
1 2000.0000 8edDsLxPEI 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 2000.0000
1023896.5 0.0020 8gbJSkwwa0 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0020
188064 0.0704 8gezVBz5qa 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.0704
188064 0.1527 8gezVBz5qa 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.1527
188064 0.0438 8gezVBz5qa 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.0438
188064 0.1696 8gezVBz5qa 4 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 0.1696
569715 0.0038 8h6wYtqIxZ 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0038
569715 1759383.8166 8h6wYtqIxZ 1 FALSE 0 NONE null FALSE
8689 14686.7767 8jFy6Pc5Pe 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 14686.7767
8689 6027.1546 8jFy6Pc5Pe 2 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 6027.1546
34606 0.0612 8jQUjnMfo4 1 TRUE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0612
34606 4000599375156900
0000000.0000
8jQUjnMfo4 2 TRUE 0 SUM null FALSE 4000599375156900
0000000.0000
37900 0.2046 8m8T5dkYoS 3 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.2046
37900 3273616047487570
00000000.0000
8m8T5dkYoS 4 TRUE 1 SUM null TRUE 3273616047487570
00000000.0000
37900 0.8200 8m8T5dkYoS 5 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 0.8200
37900 12.1094 8m8T5dkYoS 6 TRUE 1 COUNT null TRUE 12.1094
11243307 0.0002 8mSk04D40v 0 FALSE 0 COUNT null FALSE 0.0002
15803.5 4521.4226 8n9mkbEe6o 1 TRUE 1 COUNT null FALSE 4521.4226
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Figure 4: Median error vs population size for queries with no joins (a) and with joins (b).
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Figure 5: Median error vs population size (TPC-H queries).
exhibits the same trend as the previous experiment: error decreases
with increasing population size; this trend is observed for queries
with and without joins, but error tends to be higher for queries with
many joins.
5.2.2 Inherently sensitive queries
Differential privacy is designed to provide good utility for statis-
tics about large populations in the data. Queries with low popula-
tion size, by definition, pose an inherent privacy risk to individuals;
differential privacy requires poor utility for their results in order to
protect privacy. As pointed out by Dwork and Roth [25], “Ques-
tions about specific individuals cannot be safely answered with ac-
curacy, and indeed one might wish to reject them out of hand.”
Since queries with low population size are inherently sensitive
and therefore not representative of the general class of queries of
high interest for differential privacy, we exclude queries with sam-
ple size smaller than 100 in the remaining experiments. This en-
sures the results reflect the behavior of FLEX on queries for which
high utility may be expected.
5.3 Effect of Privacy Budget
In this section we evaluate the effect of the privacy budget on
utility of FLEX-based differential privacy. For each value of  in
the set {0.1, 1, 10} (keeping δ fixed at n− lnn), we computed the
median error of each query, as in the previous experiment.
We report the results in Figure 6, as a histogram grouping queries
by median error. As expected, larger values of  result in lower
median error. When  = 0.1, FLEX produces less than 1% median
error for approximately half (49.8%) of the less sensitive queries in
our dataset.
High-error queries. The previous two experiments demonstrate
that FLEX produces good utility for queries with high population
Error ε = 0.1 ε = 1 ε = 10
<1% 49.85% 60.43% 66.17%
1-5% 7.40% 4.79% 3.23%
5-10% 2.63% 0.76% 1.77%
0-25% 3.16% 1.57% 3.30%
25-100% 2.47% 3.27% 4.52%
More 34.50% 29.18% 21.02%
Pe
rc
en
t o
f R
es
ult
s
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Median Error
<1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-25% 25-100% More
ε = 0.1 ε = 1 ε = 10
 1
Figure 6: Effect of  on median error.
size, but as demonstrated by the number of queries in the “More”
bin in Figure 6, FLEX also produces high error for some queries.
To understand the root causes of this high error, we manually
examined a random sample of 50 of these queries and categorized
them according to the primary reason for the high error.
We summarize the results in Table 4. The category filter on in-
dividual’s data (8% of high error queries) includes queries that use
a piece of data specific to an individual—either to filter the sample
with a Where clause, or as a histogram bin. For example, the query
might filter the set of trips by comparing the trip’s driver ID against
a string literal containing a particular driver’s ID, or it might con-
struct a histogram grouped by the driver ID, producing a separate
bin for each individual driver. These queries are designed to return
information specific to individuals.
The category low-population statistics (72% of high error queries)
contains queries with a Where clause or histogram bin label that
shrinks the set of rows considered. A query to determine the suc-
cess rate of a promotion might restrict the trips considered to those
within a small city, during the past week, paid for using a particular
type of credit card, and using the promotion. The analyst in this
case may not intend to examine the information of any individual,
but since the query is highly dependent on a small set of rows, the
results may nevertheless reveal an individual’s information.
These categories suggest that even queries with a population size
larger than 100 can carry inherent privacy risks, therefore differen-
tial privacy requires high error for the reasons motivated earlier.
The third category (20% of high error queries) contains queries
that have many-to-many joins with large maximum frequency met-
rics and which do not benefit from any of the optimizations de-
scribed in Section 3.6. These queries are not necessarily inherently
sensitive; the high error may be due to a loose bound on local sen-
sitivity arising from elastic sensitivity’s design.
5.4 Impact of Public Table Optimization
Section 3.6 describes an optimization for queries joining on pub-
lic tables. We measure the impact of this optimization on query
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Figure 7: Impact of public table optimization.
utility by calculating median error introduced by FLEX for each
query in our dataset with the optimization enabled and disabled.
We use the same experimental setup described in the previous sec-
tion, with  = 0.1 and δ = n− lnn. As before, we exclude queries
with population size less than 100.
The optimization is applied to 23.4% of queries in our dataset.
Figure 7 shows the utility impact of the optimization across all
queries. The optimization increases the percentage of queries with
greatest utility (error less than 1.0%) from 28.5% to 49.8%. The
majority of the increase in high-utility queries come from the lowest-
utility bin (error greater than 100%) while little change is seen in
the mid-range error bins. This suggests our optimization is most
effective on queries which would otherwise produce high error, op-
timizing more than half of these queries into the 1% error bin.
5.5 Comparison with wPINQ
We aim to compare our approach to alternative differential pri-
vacy mechanisms with equivalent support for real-world queries.
Of the mechanisms listed in Section 2.3, only wPINQ supports
counting queries with the full spectrum of join types.
Since wPINQ programs are implemented in C#, we are unable to
run wPINQ directly on our SQL query dataset. Instead we compare
the utility between the two mechanisms for a selected set of repre-
sentative queries. The precise behavior of each mechanism may
differ for every query, however this experiment provides a relative
comparison of the mechanisms for the most common cases.
Experiment Setup. We selected a set of representative queries
based on the most common equijoin patterns (joined tables and join
condition) across all counting queries in our dataset. We identify
the three most common join patterns for both histogram and non-
histogram queries and select a random query representing each.
Our six selected queries collectively represent 8.6% of all join pat-
terns in our dataset.
For each selected query we manually transcribe the query into
a wPINQ program. To ensure a fair comparison, we use wPINQ’s
select operator rather than the join operator for joins on a public
table. This ensures that no noise is added to protect records in pub-
lic tables, equivalent to the optimization described in Section 3.6.
Our input data for these programs includes all records from the
cities table, which is public, and a random sample of 1.5 million
records from each private table (it was not feasible to download the
full tables, which contain over 2 billion records). We execute each
program 100 times with the wPINQ runtime [13].
To obtain baseline (non-differentially private) results we run each
SQL query on a database populated with only the sampled records.
For elastic sensitivity we use max-frequency metrics calculated from
Table 4: Manual categorization of queries with high error.
Category Percent
Filters on individual’s data 8%
Low-population statistics 72%
Many-to-many Join causes high elastic sensitivity 20%
this sampled data. We compute the median error for each query
using the methodology described in the previous section, setting
 = 0.1 for both mechanisms.
Table 5 summarizes the queries and median error results. FLEX
provides lower median error than wPINQ for programs 1, 2, 3 and
6—more than 90% lower for 2 and 3 and nearly 50% lower for
programs 1 and 6. FLEX produces higher error than wPINQ for
programs 4 and 5.
In the case of program 5, both mechanisms produce errors above
900%. The median population size of 1 for this program indicates
that our experiment data includes very few trips per driver that sat-
isfy the filter conditions. Elastic sensitivity provides looser bounds
on local sensitivity for queries that filter more records, resulting
in a comparably higher error for queries such as this one. Given
that such queries are inherently sensitive, a high error (low utility)
is required for any differential privacy mechanism, therefore the
comparably higher error of FLEX is likely insignificant in practice.
Proserpio et al. [47] describe a post-processing step for generat-
ing synthetic data by using wPINQ results to guide a Markov-Chain
Monte Carlo simulation. The authors show that this step improves
utility for graph triangle counting queries when the original query
is executed on the synthetic dataset. While this strategy may pro-
duce higher utility than the results presented in Table 5, we do not
evaluate wPINQ with this additional step since it is not currently
automated.
6. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy was originally proposed by Dwork [20, 21,
23], and the reference by Dwork and Roth [25] provides an excel-
lent general overview of differential privacy. Much of this work
focuses on mechanisms for releasing the results of specific algo-
rithms. Our focus, in contrast, is on a general-purpose mechanism
for SQL queries that supports general equijoins. We survey the
existing general mechanisms that support join in Section 2.3.
Lu et al. [38] propose a mechanism for generating differentially
private synthetic data such that queries with joins have similar per-
formance characteristics, but not necessarily similar answers, on
the synthetic and true databases. However, Lu et al. do not pro-
pose a mechanism for answering queries with differential privacy.
As such, it does not satisfy either of the two requirements in Sec-
tion 2.2.
Airavat [48] enforces differential privacy for arbitrary MapRe-
duce programs, but requires the analyst to bound the range of pos-
sible outputs of the program, and clamps output values to lie within
that range. Fuzz [28, 29] enforces differential privacy for func-
tional programs, but does not support one-to-many or many-to-
many joins.
Propose-test-release [22] (PTR) is a framework for leveraging
local sensitivity that works for arbitrary real-valued functions. PTR
requires (but does not define) a way to calculate the local sensitivity
of a function. Our work on elastic sensitivity is complementary and
can enable the use of PTR by providing a bound on local sensitivity.
Sample & aggregate [44,45] is a data-dependent framework that
applies to all statistical estimators. It works by splitting the data-
base into chunks, running the query on each chunk, and aggregat-
ing the results using a differentially private algorithm. Sample &
aggregate cannot support joins, since splitting the database breaks
join semantics, nor does it support queries that are not statistical
estimators, such as counting queries. GUPT [41] is a practical sys-
tem that leverages the sample & aggregate framework to enforce
differential privacy for general-purpose analytics.
The Exponential Mechanism [39] supports queries that produce
categorical (rather than numeric) data. It works by randomly se-
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Table 5: Utility comparison of wPINQ and FLEX for selected set of representative counting queries using join.
Program Joined tables
Median Median Error (%)
Population
wPINQ
Elastic
Size Sensitivity
1. Count distinct drivers who have completed a trip in San Francisco yet enrolled as a driver in a different city. trips, drivers 663 45.9 22.6
2. Count driver accounts that are active and were tagged after June 6 as duplicate accounts. users, user tags 734 71.5 2.8
3. Count motorbike drivers in Hanoi who are currently active and have completed 10 or more trips. drivers, analytics 212 51.4 4.72
4. Histogram: Daily trips by city (for all cities) on Oct. 24, 2016. trips, cities 87 11.5 23
5. Histogram: Total trips per driver in Hong Kong between Sept. 9 and Oct. 3, 2016. trips, drivers 1 974 6437
6. Histogram: Drivers by different thresholds of total completed trips for drivers registered in Syndey, AUS
who have completed a trip within the past 28 days.
drivers, analytics 72 51.5 27.8
lecting from the possible outputs according to a scoring function
provided by the analyst. Extending FLEX to support the exponen-
tial mechanism would require specification of the scoring function
and a means to bound its sensitivity.
A number of less-general mechanisms for performing specific
graph analysis tasks have been proposed [31, 34, 35, 49]. These
tasks often involve joins, but the mechanisms used to handle them
are specific to the task and are not applicable for general-purpose
analytics. For example, the recursive mechanism [16] supports
general equijoins in the context of graph analyses, but is restricted
to monotonic queries and in the worst case, runs in time exponential
in the number of participants in the database.
Kifer et al. [36] point out that database constraints (such as unique-
ness of a primary key) can lead to leaks of private data. Such con-
straints are common in practice, and raise concerns for all differen-
tial privacy approaches. Kifer et al. propose increasing sensitivity
based on the specific constraints involved, but calculating this sen-
sitivity is computationally hard. Developing a tractable method to
account for common constraints, such as primary key uniqueness,
is an interesting target for future work.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper takes a first step towards practical differential pri-
vacy for general-purpose SQL queries. To meet the requirements
of real-world SQL queries, we proposed elastic sensitivity, the first
efficiently-computed approximation of local sensitivity that sup-
ports joins. We have released an open-source tool for computing
elastic sensitivity of SQL queries [4]. We use elastic sensitivity
to build FLEX, a system for enforcing differential privacy for SQL
queries. We evaluated FLEX on a wide variety of queries, demon-
strating that FLEX can support real-world queries and provides high
utility on a majority of queries with large population sizes.
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